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We present a simple protocol where Alice and Bob only needs sending out a coherent state or not-
sending out a coherent state to Charlie. There is no bases switching. We show that this protocol is
both encoding-state-side-channel free to the source part and measurement-device-independent. We
don’t have to control exactly the whole space state of the light pulse, which is an impossible task in
practice. The protocol is immune to all adverse due to encoding-state imperfections in side-channel
space such as the photon frequency spectrum, emission time, propagation direction, spatial angular
moment, and so on. Numerical simulation shows that our scheme can reach a side-channel-free result
for quantum key distribution over a distance longer than 200 km given the single-photon-interference
misalignment error rate of 20%.
I Introduction Guaranteed by principles of quantum
mechanics, quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide
a secure key for private communication [1, 2] even though
Eve can completely control the channel. However, there
are side-channel effects due to the device imperfections
in practice[3–10]. In general, we can divide the whole
space of an encoding state from a real source into two
subspaces, the operational space and the side channel
space. Even though the source state encoding looks per-
fect when it is examined in the operational space, there
could be security loopholes due to imperfections in the
side channel space, this is what we called side-channel ef-
fects. For example, in the BB84 protocol[1], even though
a perfect single-photon source is applied, there are still
some side-channel effects which can undermine the secu-
rity assumed in the operational space. There could be
basis-dependent synchronization errors in pulse emitting
time or frequency spectrum difference for different encod-
ing states or bases and Eve can make use of this to judge
the basis or encoding state chosen in a certain time win-
dow. In general, all encoding states from the source live
in an infinite dimensional space which is formed by the
operational space and the side-channel space. Though we
only use the encoding space (e.g., polarization) for QKD,
Eve can do his attack in side-channel space such as fre-
quency space to obtain information. Given the inevitable
imperfections in the side-channel space for the encoding
states, Eve can make use of these and obtain informa-
tion without causing any change to the Alice and Bob’s
observation outcome in the operation space. As we shall
show latter, given a lossy channel, by taking side chan-
nel attacks to the source, Eve can actually almost obtain
full information of a QKD result without disturbing the
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encoding states in the operational space. Here we pro-
pose a QKD scheme that is both source encoding-state-
side-channel-free and measurement device independent
(MDI)[11–13]. Although some existing protocols can also
achieve the goal of side-channel-free security [12, 14], our
protocol presented here is the only one that bases on the
matured existing technologies and there is no demanding
on the local detection efficiency.
Our protocol is not source device independent. The
so called encoding-state-side-channel free means that we
don’t worry about any information leakage from the side-
channel space of the encoded states. We do have condi-
tions in the operational space. In this work we assume
that the encoding states from the source behave perfectly
when they are measured in the operational space, but can
be imperfect in the side-channel space. Hopefully, the
condition on the operational space can be loosened in
the future. Actually, there are lots of studies on security
with inexact encoding states[9, 10, 13, 15] in the opera-
tional space. On the other hand, doing calibration only
in the operational space seems to be much easier than
that in the whole space, which seems to be an impossi-
ble task in practice. Also, our protocol is side-channel
free for the encoding states only. It assumes no infor-
mation leakage due to other hidden accesses beyond the
sent-out encoding states. Say, the source has no hidden
classical information leakage. Note that in the existing
device-independent protocols, there are also similar as-
sumed conditions for security, although the conditions
are on the measurement devices rather than the encod-
ing states. Since our protocol is measurement device in-
dependent, there is no condition on the measurement de-
vices for security. The security of our protocol is obvi-
ously stronger than the normal MDI-QKD because there
is no security loophole in the encoding states of our pro-
tocol. Compared with the existing device-independent
QKD, our protocol has a drawback in that it is not en-
2tirely source-independent, but it has an advantage of
measurement-device-independent. Note that the device
independent QKD is not MDI, because it requests no in-
formation leakage of the measurement outcome. Most
importantly, our protocol only rely on matured technolo-
gies and it can achieve a meaningful secure distance, a
distance longer than 200 kilometers even though the mis-
alignment error rate is as large as 20%.
II Some side-channel attacks and Theorem 1. Con-
sider a two-basis QKD protocol, such as the BB84 proto-
col, where there are X basis and Z basis in the protocol.
Suppose we take state-encoding in the photon polariza-
tion space and we regard the polarization space as the
operational space. In the existing methods in generating
the different encoding states, we need either use different
diodes to generate different encoding states or use only
one diode together with randomly chosen modulations,
such as flipping, rotation, phase shift, etc. These opera-
tions can cause differences in the side channel space. In
particular, the frequency spectrums can be a little bit
different for different encoding states or different bases.
In principle, by detecting frequency difference, Eve has a
chance to know which encoding state is used in the oper-
ational space and she will cause no change to the states
in operational space. As another example, if different en-
coding states are actually emitted at different time, Eve
may just measure the photon with a very precise clock
and she can sometimes know the coding state almost ex-
actly if the photon wave packet collapses at certain time
intervals. Also, Eve may make use of the channel loss,
she can choose to block all those photons on which the
side-channel attack done by her is not successful. Thus,
small bias of a state in the side-channel space may flaw
the whole protocol.
Fortunately, the ideal source is not the only secure
source. A real-life source is secure if it can be mapped
from an ideal source. Suppose in a certain protocol K
requests k different encoding states. For example, in the
BB84 protocol, we need 4 encoding states. Perfect source
P always produces a perfect encoding state in every time
window and all states are identical in the side channel
space. An imperfect source produces non-ideal encod-
ing states in the whole space, with imperfections in the
side-channel space and the states in side-channel space
can change from time to time. Say, at a certain time
window, the imperfect source produces the k encoding
states in the whole space and we name them as set Si.
We then randomly choose one from Si and send it out
for QKD. If there is always a (time-dependent) quantum
process Mi that maps the k perfect states to the corre-
sponding k non-ideal states in set Si, then we say source
S can be mapped from a perfect source P .
Theorem 1 In any QKD protocol, a real-life source S
emitting imperfect states in the whole space is equiva-
lent to a perfect (virtual) source P emitting perfect states
which are all identical in side channel space if there exists
a quantum process M that can map source P to source
S. The final key of a QKD protocol using source S can
FIG. 1: Schematic picture of side-channel-free QKD.
be calculated by assuming that the virtual source P were
used.
This conclusion is rather obvious. Suppose S is inse-
cure, then in a QKD protocol where the ideal source P
is applied, Eve can first use the quantum process M to
transform it into source S and then attack the QKD pro-
tocol as if the protocol used source S. This means that
if S is not secure then P is not secure either. Here in the
theorem above, the quantum processM is not limited to
a unitary process, although in showing the side-channel
free property of our protocol we mainly use a unitary
map.
III Our protocol
In our protocol, we use the idea of twin-field QKD
(TFQKD)[16] with the classical bit value encoding done
by the decisions of sending or not-sending made by Al-
ice and Bob. The schematic picture of side-channel-free
QKD is shown in Fig. 1. Our protocol is different from
[17] in that we directly use the whole non-random-phase
coherent states. There are 3 parties, Alice, Bob, and
the third party Charlie[16]. They (Alice and Bob) will
use coherent states and vacuum only. We first present
our protocol in the operational space only and then show
why it is side-channel free using our Theorem 1.
Protocol R, real protocol
R-1 At any time window i, Alice (Bob) always prepare
a coherent state |αA〉 =
∑∞
n=0
e−µ/2µn/2einγA√
n!
(|αB〉 =∑∞
n=0
e−µ/2µn/2einγB√
n!
) and announces the states, includ-
ing the global phases γA, γB. With a probability q Alice
(Bob) decides sending, and with a probability 1 − q she
(he) decides not-sending. If she (he) decides sending, she
(he) sends out the coherent state |αA〉 (|αB〉) to Charlie
and puts down a classical bit value 1 (0) locally; if she
(he) decides not-sending she (he) does not send out any-
thing, i.e., she (he) sends out a vacuum to Charlie and
3puts down a classical bit value 0 (1) locally.
R-2 Charlie announces his measurement outcome and
hence determines the effective events: an event with one
and only one detector clicking announced by Charlie. A
time window or classical bit value corresponding to an
effective event is named as an effective time window or
effective bit.
Definition Z˜-window: A time window when Alice decides
sending and Bob decides not-sending, or Alice decides
not-sending and Bob decides sending.
R-3 Through classical communication, they take a ran-
dom subset of time windows v to test the bit-flip er-
ror rate; they take another random subset of time win-
dows u to verify the upper bound value of phase-flip error
rate e¯ph of the effective bits corresponding to Z˜-windows,
those time windows when one party from Alice and Bob
decides sending and the other party decides not-sending.
They discard effective bits from v-windows or u-windows
after error test.
R-4 They distill (by taking error correction and privacy
amplification to ) the remaining effective bits after error
test, with the asymptotic result for number of final bits:
nF = nZ˜ − nZ˜H(e¯ph)− fntH(EZ) (1)
where the entropy functional H(x) = −x log2 x − (1 −
x) log2(1− x); nZ˜ (nt) is the number of remaining effec-
tive bits from Z˜-windows (all time windows) after error
test; f is the correction efficiency factor.
Note 1 The encoding is done by decisions on sending or
not-sending made by Alice and Bob. More precisely, the
sending or not-sending decision of a time window always
corresponds to the local classical bits 1, 0 to Alice, or 0, 1
to Bob. We can also imagine that whenever Alice (Bob)
decides sending or not-sending, she (he) always produces
a local ancillary photon-number state |1〉 or |0〉 and the
corresponding bit values are encoded in the local ancil-
lary state. To Alice (Bob), state |0〉 corresponds to a bit
value 0 (1) and state |1〉 corresponds to a bit value 1 (0).
This is equivalent to say that they (Alice and Bob) have
used an extended state including real-photon state which
will be sent out to Charlie and ancillary state placed lo-
cally. For example, in a certain window when Alice de-
cides sending and Bob decides not sending, we can imag-
ine that they have actually prepared an extended state
(ρA · |0〉〈0|)⊗ |10〉〈10|. (2)
where ρA = |αA〉〈αA|. The real-photon state ρA · |0〉〈0|
will be sent out to Charlie. In this paper, we shall name
the state left to the tensor-product symbol ⊗ as the real-
photon state, and the state right to the tensor-product
symbol ⊗ as the ancillary-photon state. As stated al-
ready, each one’s bit value is actually encoded in the
local ancillary photon-number state.
Note 2 The bit-flip error and phase-flip error. Bob makes
a wrong bit encoding if his bit value is different from Al-
ice’s bit value at a certain time window. To every event
in the subset v randomly taken by them, they announce
each one’s bit values (decision on sending or not-sending)
to judge the bit-flip error rate. Also, as shown in the
Appendix, using the details of events in set v, they can
calculate the phase-flip error rate e¯ph by Eq.(11).
Note 3 Charlie’s compensation. To obtain a good key
rate, they need a low phase-flip error rate. In the pro-
tocol, an event of right-detector clicking due to the real-
photon state |αA〉 ⊗ |αB〉 = |√µeiγA〉 ⊗ |√µeiγB 〉 will
contribute to the phase-flip errors. The states |αA〉 and
|αB〉 are publicly announced, Charlie can do compensa-
tion to remove the global phases γA and γB in the states,
so that the clicking detector is very unlikely to be the
right detector given the real-photon state |αA〉 ⊗ |αB〉.
Very importantly, as shown in the Appendix, although
Charlie’s collaboration can lead to a high key rate, the
security of the protocol does not rely on Charlie’s hon-
esty.
Note 4 Why it is side-channel free ? Intuitively speaking,
our protocol takes no physical-bases switching. Other
protocols, such as the BB84, MDIQKD protocol, the
TFQKD, and so on, they all need to take modulation
to the outcome states differently in switching between
different bases. We can give a strict proof for the side-
channel free property of our protocol. Here we show
directly by our Theorem 1 that the protocol R is side
channel free, say, if it is secure in operational space, it
must be also secure in the whole space including the side
channel space. Later in the appendix we present the
measurement-device-independent security proof of the
protocol itself in operational space only, i.e., in the case
we don’t consider any side-channel effects. Here we only
need to show that the protocol is the encoding-state-
side-channel free. In step R-1, they try to prepare a
coherent state |αA〉, |αB〉 in the operational space. In
the ideal case we don’t need to consider the side-channel
space. For example, in the case that any Fock state |n〉,
no matter it is from Alice’s state |αA〉 or from Bob’s
state |αB〉, are identical in side-channel space. So, we
shall just use the original notations of |αA〉 and |αB〉 to
represent the ideal whole-space state. However, what is
actually prepared in a real experiment must have imper-
fections in the side-channel space. But the vacuum state
has no side channel space therefore we only need to con-
sider side-channel-space for the non-vacuum parts in each
coherent state. Say, |αx〉 = e−µ/2|0〉+
√
1− e−µ|α˜x〉and√
1− e−µ|α˜x〉 = |αx〉−e−µ/2|0〉 where x can be A,B. We
only need consider the whole-space state of |α˜x〉. There-
fore, we need to consider the corresponding whole-space
states in the following form instead of the ideal states:
|0〉 −→ |0〉
|αA〉 −→ e−µ/2|0〉+
√
1− e−µ|ψA(α˜A)〉
|αB〉 −→ e−µ/2|0〉+
√
1− e−µ|ψB(α˜B)〉. (3)
Here the states left to the arrow are the ideal states and
the states right to the arrow are the corresponding real-
life states. States |ψA(α˜A)〉 and |ψB(α˜B)〉 contain what-
ever side-channel information such as the frequency spec-
4trum, the polarization, the wave shape, the emission time
and so on. We assume Eve exactly knows all these infor-
mation. These mean, Eve knows all details of the state in
the whole space and she can write down the whole-space
states exactly and she can make use of it in whatever way
she likes. However, consider the form of Eq.(3), it is obvi-
ous that there exists a unitary operation relates the ideal
states and the whole-space states used in the protocol.
Note that here we don’t assume errors in the operational
space. This means when we assume a non-ideal whole-
space state, it must be able to present the same result in
the operational space with that of the ideal state. Say, for
state |ψA(α˜A)〉, if it is measured in photon-number space,
it can only present the same probability distribution Pn
for different photon number states with ideal state |α˜〉
result, i.e., |〈n|ψA(α˜A)〉|2 = |〈n|α˜A〉|2. Given this, we
immediately know that 〈0|ψA(α˜A)〉 = 〈0|ψB(α˜B)〉 = 0
Therefore there exists the following unitary transforma-
tions:
UA|0〉 = UB|0〉 = |0〉 UA|α˜A〉 = |ψA(α˜A)〉
UB|α˜B〉 = |ψB(α˜B)〉 (4)
These equations show that the real-life source which
emits non-ideal whole-space states can be mapped from
an ideal source by two mode unitary transformation
UA ⊗ UB. Say, given an ideal two mode source in the
protocol, one can simply take unitary transformation UA
to every encoding state from Alice’s ideal physical source
and take a unitary transformation UB to every encod-
ing state from Bob’s ideal physical source, they can in
this way obtain all their imperfect states of the real-life
source. Applying our Theorem 1, we immediately con-
clude that our real protocol, protocol R is secure with a
real-life source if it is secure with an ideal source.
Obviously, the protocol allows to use a source with un-
stable side-channel information. Say, at any time window
i, they have prepared the whole-space candidature states
|ψAi(α˜A)〉 and |ψBi(α˜B)〉, we only need to replace the
unitary transformation UA and UB in Eq.(4) by UAi and
UBi.
Note 5 Intensity difference does not affect the security.
Though we demonstrate the protocol with the condition
|αA| = |αB| = µ, however, this condition is not needed
for security. We only need that the intensities of all time
windows are upper bounded by µ . Say, at any individ-
ual time window i, we have |αAi| = √µAi ≤ √µ and
|αBi| = √µBi ≤ √µ. All these states can be obtained
from an imagined coherent state of intensity µ by atten-
uation. Again, applying our Theorem 1 we can assume
that they are using coherent states with stable and exact
intensity µ[18].
Discussions: Revised protocol by post selection. In the
protocol, to produce a good key rate, we need Charlie
take phase compensation effectively. Technically, we can
further simplify the protocol without such type of ac-
tive operation. Instead, Alice and Bob can do post se-
lection, they only use those effective events whose cor-
responding initially prepared state |αA〉 = |√µeiγA〉,
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FIG. 2: Log scale of the key rate as a function of the distance
between Alice and Bob with different misalignment error rate.
ea: single-photon misalignment error.
|αB〉 = |√µeiγB 〉 in the time window satisfying
1− | cos(γB − γA)| ≤ |λ|. (5)
If we take a very small |λ| value, the phase-flip error rate
will be small, though the data size is also small.
Though the protocol presented above is source-side-
channel free, it is no entirely source-independent, such
as those device-independent protocols [14] and the pro-
tocol shown in[12]. Our protocol takes no assumption
for the side channel space, but it has conditions in the
operational space. The security proof in its present form
assumes an exact vacuum and the sub-Poisson distribu-
tion in Fock space for the coherent state. Possibly, these
conditions can be loosened through the worst-case study
in the future. However we believe even in its present form
it has obvious advantages in security already.
Numerical simulation. Assume detector dark count rate
to be 10−11 with detection efficiency of 80%, a linear
lossy channel with transmittance η = 0.1−L/100km, and
the correction efficiency is f = 1.1. The results of nu-
merical simulation are shown in Fig. 2.
Appendix
A. Outline
There are two parts for the security proof here. Part
1 includes virtual protocols and reduction. In part 1,
through virtual protocols and reductions that we first
show the security if they only used Z˜-windows. In a real
protocol, they sometimes use Z˜-windows and sometimes
use other time windows. We regard effective bits from
Z˜-windows as un-tagged bits and the effective bits from
other time windows as tagged bits. Applying the tagged
model[19] we can obtain the key rate formula as Eq.(1).
5In the formula, we need two parameters, the bit-flip error
rate and the phase-flip error rate. A bit-flip error is the
case that Alice and Bob have different values for an effec-
tive bit. Therefore the bit-flip error rate can be directly
tested by the subset v. The phase-flip error is originally
defined on the phase-flip rate of virtual ancillary pho-
tons. Which can be verified by observing the effective
events of X-windows in a virtual protocol, heralded by
different detectors (left-detector, L, or right detector, R).
The X-windows in a virtual protocol contains two sub-
sets, an X+-window that sends out a real-photon state
ρ+ = |χ+〉〈χ+| and an X−-window that sends out a real-
photon state ρ− = |χ−〉〈χ−| and
|χ±〉 = (|0, αB〉 ± |αA, 0〉)/N± (6)
where 1/N± are normalization factors for states |χ±〉. In
our virtual protocol, they set a probability |N+|2/4 for an
X+-window and a probability |N−|2/4 for anX−-window
whenever they use an X-window. The sent out states of
an X-window is
ρX = |N+|2ρ+/4 + |N−|2ρ−/4. (7)
As shall be shown, the phase flip error rate is
eph =
nRX+ + n
L
X−
nX
=
nRX+ + n
L
X − nLX+
nX
≤ e¯ph = n¯
R
X+
+ nLX − nLX+
nX
(8)
where nda is the number of effective X-windows heralded
by joint events of d and a, and d = L,R, a = X+, X−, X ;
and nX = n
L
X + n
R
X . Event d: Charlie announces that
detector d has clicked and the other detector has not
click. Event a: it is a time window of a. However, in a
real protocol, we don’t have such a state, and hence we
have no way to obtain the value by direct observation.
But we can still verify the upper bound of the phase-flip
error rate by observing data of other states in the real
protocol with calculation formulas presented in Part 2.
Say, in the real protocol, they randomly take two subsets
of all time windows, v and u. Details on sending or not-
sending of u are never announced. But we know that
set u contains a number of Z˜ windows whose density
operator is
ρZ˜ =
1
2
(|0, αB〉〈|0, αB|+ |αA, 0〉〈αA, 0|) (9)
Obviously, the density operator has another equivalent
convex and
ρZ˜ = ρX (10)
This means, in a virtual protocol, if we don’t announce
any information on sending or not-sending of time win-
dows in set u, to Eve, those Z˜-windows in set u are iden-
tical toX-windows. Say, in a real protocol, set u contains
fake X-windows which are identical to true X-windows
to Eve. We can then verify the value of e¯ph of fake X-
windows by observing and calculating the data of another
subset of time windows, set v in the real protocol. Ex-
plicitly, as shall be shown in part 2, we need the following
data in the calculation:
1, The d-event rate of time windows A, denoted by SdA. It
is just the fraction of effective time windows heralded by
event d from A-windows. Here d = L,R, for an effective
event of detector d clicking and the other detector not
clicking as announced by Charlie. We need the values
of SdA for d = L,R and A = Z˜,B,O, where B is for a
time window when both Alice and Bob decide sending,
and O is a time window when both Alice and Bob decide
not-sending. As shall be shown in Part 2, based on these
observed data, we can then calculate the upper bound of
phase-flip error rate, e¯ph. Explicitly
eph ≤ eph =
(1 + e−2µ)
[
S
R
X+ − SLX+
]
+ 2SL
Z˜
2(SL
Z˜
+ SR
Z˜
)
(11)
where S
d
X+ (S
d
X+) is the upper bound (lower bound) of
SdX+ , with d = L,R and
S
d
X+ =
1
2(1 + e−µ)
{e−µSdO +
1
e−µ
SdB +
(1− e−µ)2
e−µ
+ 2
√
SdOS
d
B + 2(1− e−µ)
√
SdO
+
2(1− e−µ)
e−µ
√
SdB} ≥ SdX+
(12)
SdX+ =
1
2(1 + e−µ)
{e−µSdO +
1
e−µ
SdB
− [2
√
SdOS
d
B + 2(1− e−µ)
√
SdO
+
2(1− e−µ)
e−µ
√
SdB]} ≤ SdX+
(13)
B. Part 1, virtual protocols, reduction, and key
rate from tagged model
Definitions of effective event: We define an effective
event if Charlie announces one and only one detector
clicking for an individual Z-window. They will then only
use states or data corresponding to effective events in
the protocol. A time window that presents an effective
event is named as an effective time window. An effective
ancillary photon is an ancillary photon corresponding to
an effective event. A classical bit from an effective time
window is named as an effective bit.
Event L or L-event: an effective event of the left detector
clicking and the right detector not-clicking; Event R or
R-event: an effective event of the right detector clicking
and the left detector not-clicking.
61. Virtual protocol V1
Preparation stage
They pre-share classical information for different time
windows they will use, X-windows and Z-windows. They
also pre-share an extended state
Ωi = |Ψi〉〈Ψi|
|Ψi〉 = 1√
2
(|0, αB〉 ⊗ |01〉+ |αA, 0〉 ⊗ |10〉) (14)
for the ith time window. Here |αA| = |αB | = √µ,
|αAi〉 = |√µeiγAi〉, |αBi〉 = |√µeiγBi〉. They announce
the states including the global phases γAi, γBi
For presentation simplicity, we shall omit the sub-
scripts i in all phase values γAi , γBi and states. Also,
we introduce states |χ+〉, |χ−〉 as defined by Eq.(6) for
the extended state. Explicitly, it can be written in
|Ψ〉 = (N+|χ+〉 ⊗ |Φ0〉+N−|χ−〉 ⊗ |Φ1〉) /2 (15)
and |Φ0〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), |Φ1〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉).
Virtual Protocol V1
V1-1 At any time window i, no matter it is a Z-window or
an X-window, they send out to Charlie the real-photon
state from state Ω as defined by Eq.(14) and keep the
ancillary photons locally.
V1-2 Charlie announces his measurement outcome of all
time windows. This announcement determines the effec-
tive time windows.
Definition: They can now divide their time windows into
4 subsets, XL, XR, ZL, ZR where a time window of Wd
is an effective W-window heralded by detector d click-
ing and the other detector not clicking. W = X,Z, and
d = L,R. Also, we shall use AWd for the set of effective
ancillary photons of time window Wd.
V1-3 They check the phase-flip error rate eph for set of
AXd , where d = L,R, which is also the estimated phase-
flip error rates of set AZd .
V1-4 They purify the ancillary photons of sets AZL
and AZR separately. After purification, they obtain high
quality single-photon states |Φ0〉 or |Φ1〉 with (almost)
100% purity. They each measures the photon number lo-
cally to the purified photons and obtain the final key kf .
Alice puts down a bit value 0 or 1 whenever she obtains a
measurement outcome of vacuum or 1 photon, Bob puts
down a bit value 1 or 0 whenever she obtains a measure-
ment outcome of vacuum or 1 photon.
Note 1 Security . The security of the final key is based on
the faithfulness of the purification[20], i.e., the estimation
of phase-flip error rate. Charlie has determined effective
ancillary photons but Alice and Bob test the phase-flip
error rate themselves in step 1-3. The extended state of
an X-window identical to that of a Z-window, therefore
the phase-flip-error rate value of set AXd is exactly the
value of set AZd .
Note 2 Definitions of phase-flip-error rate.
Suppose set AXd contains nd effective ancillary pho-
tons. If each photon of set AXd was measured in basis
{|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉} and there were nd0 outcome of |Φ0〉〈Φ0|, and
nd1 outcome of |Φ1〉〈Φ1|, the phase-flip error rate for set
AXd is
eph =
min
(
nd0, n
d
1
)
nd
. (16)
Changing the values of nd0, n
d
1, n
d into the corresponding
values of set AZd in Eq.(16), we can define the phase flip
error rate for setAZd . Statistically, eph for setAXd is also
the asymptotic phase-flip error rate of set AZd . To know
the values eph, they can choose to measure each photon
of set AXd in basis {|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉}. But instead of this,
they can also choose to take local measurements in basis
{|x±〉} in each side and check the parity of each mea-
surement outcome. (Outcome of |x+〉|x+〉 or |x−〉|x−〉)
are even-parity while |x+〉|x−〉 or |x−〉|x+〉 are odd par-
ity.) Note that all effective ancillary photons are single-
photons. As it is easy to see , for single-photons, the
fraction of odd parity (even parity) outcome from mea-
surement of each side in basis {|x±〉} is exactly equal
to the fraction of |Φ1〉〈Φ1| (|Φ0〉〈Φ0|) outcome from the
measurement in basis {|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉}. Moreover, this mea-
surement step is only needed here for this Virtual pro-
tocol, it is not needed for a real protocol. For ease of
presentation, we suppose they use the measurement ba-
sis {|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉}.
Note 3 Reduction of pre-shared states for X-windows
Reduction 1 It makes no difference to anyone outside if
they measure all ancillary photons of X-windows in ba-
sis {|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉} before the protocol starts. After mea-
surement to the ancillary photon, they obtain one of the
following outcome extended state for an X-window, de-
pending on the measurement outcome of ancillary pho-
ton:
either
|χ+〉〈χ+| ⊗ |Φ0〉〈Φ0| (17)
with probability |N+|2/4 and
|χ−〉〈χ−| ⊗ |Φ1〉〈Φ1| (18)
with probability |N−|2/4.
Reduction 2 Alternatively, they can just start with states
of Eq.(17,18) for their X-windows. They need pre-share
classical information on Z-windows, X+-windows, and
X−-windows. The pre-shared classical information for
X-windows assign a probability |N+|2/4 for X+-window
and a probability |N−|2/4 for X−-window. They pre-
share real-photon states |χ+〉〈χ+| for X+-windows and
|χ−〉〈χ−| for X−-windows. Imagine that they also pre-
share some single-photon states |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉. (These
states |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉 are not really necessary, to show
everything clearly we assume so at this moment.)
In an X+-window, they label a pre-shared state |Φ0〉 as
the ancillary photon for this state |χ+〉 above and have
an extended state
Ω+ = |χ+〉〈χ+| ⊗ |Φ0〉〈Φ0| (19)
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In an X−-window, they label a pre-shared state |Φ1〉 as
the ancillary photon for this state |χ−〉 above and have
an extended state
Ω− = |χ−〉〈χ−| ⊗ |Φ1〉〈Φ1| (20)
They then send the real-photon state |χ−〉 out to Charlie.
Here we have used the same definition for |χ+〉, |χ−〉 as
Eq.(6).
From Eq.(19) and Eq.(20) we can see that, in an X+-
window, the ancillary-photon state must be |Φ0〉; in an
X−-window, the ancillary-photon state must be |Φ1〉.
Therefore, according to our Definition 1, they can use
the following more operable definition to calculate each
quantities in Eq.(16)
nd0 = n
d
X+ (21)
nd1 = n
d
X− (22)
for Eq.(16). Here ndX± is the number of X+-windows
or X−-windows heralded by detector d clicking and the
other detector not clicking, and d = L,R, L for left de-
tector and R for right detector.
eph =
min
(
ndX+ , n
d
X−
)
nd
. (23)
Given this phase-flip error rate formula, the ancillary
photons for X-windows are actually not needed in the
protocol.
Note 4 quasi-purification
Since their goal is to have the final key only, a true purifi-
cation to ancillary photons is not necessary[21]. They can
choose to measure all ancillary photons of Z-windows in
advance[21] in photon-number basis and then take vir-
tual purification to classical data of Z-windows corre-
sponding to those effective events. They then take a vir-
tual quasi-purification to the classical data, which is just
the final key distillation. Also, the pre-shared extended
state for a Z-window is just (|0, αB〉〈0, αB| ⊗ |01〉〈01|+
|αA, 0〉〈αA, 0| ⊗ |10〉〈10|)/2.
Note 5 Purifying all effective ancillary photons in one
batch. Definitely, they can choose to purify all effective
ancillary photons of Z-windows in one batch. The phase-
flip error rate is
eph =
min
(
nLX+ , n
L
X−
)
+min
(
nRX+ , n
R
X−
)
nX
(24)
where nX = n
L
X+
+ nLX− + n
R
X+
+ nRX− is the number of
all effective X-windows. Surely, nLX− ≥ min
(
nLX+ , n
L
X−
)
and nRX+ ≥ min
(
nRX+ , n
R
X−
)
. Therefore the phase-flip
error rate formula of Eq.(24) can be simplified into
eph ≤ n
L
X−
+ nRX+
nX
(25)
which is simply first to count the number of effective X−-
windows heralded by left detector and also the effective
X+-windows heralded by the right detector and then take
the rate of errors per effective X-window.
If they use this formula, Charlie can make a high quality
raw state of effective ancillary photons for Alice and Bob
by setting his measurement set-up properly so that with
very small probability for the left-detector-clicking (right-
detector-clicking) due to the incident state of |χ−〉 (|χ+〉).
2. Virtual protocol V2
Preparation stage
Here we assume they pre-share a mixed state of
Ω =
∑
y
pyΩy (26)
y = 0, 1,B,O,+,−, p0 = p1 and
Ω0 = |0, αB〉〈0, αB| ⊗ |01〉〈01| (27)
Ω1 = |αA, 0〉〈αA, 0| ⊗ |10〉〈10| (28)
ΩB = |αA, αB〉〈αA, αB| ⊗ |11〉〈11| (29)
ΩO = |0, 0〉〈0, 0| ⊗ |00〉〈00| (30)
Ω+ = |χ+〉〈χ+| ⊗ |2, 2〉〈2, 2| (31)
Ω− = |χ−〉〈χ−| ⊗ |3, 3〉〈3, 3|. (32)
They don’t pre-share any classical information for time
windows. For clarity in presentation, we define differ-
ent kinds of time windows by the local ancillary states:
|01〉〈01| for Z0, |10〉〈10| for Z1, |11〉〈11| for ZB, |00〉〈00|
for ZO, |2, 2〉〈2, 2| for X+, and |3, 3〉〈3, 3| for X−.
Time window Z0 (Z1) corresponds to the case Alice
(Bob) decides not-sending and Bob (Alice) decides send-
ing. Time window ZB (ZO) corresponds to the case that
both Alice and Bob decide sending (not-sending).
They don’t know which time window belongs to which
kind of windows say Zy-window for y = 0, 1,B,O or Xy-
window for y = + or −. But they know how much Z˜-
windows (Z0-windows or Z1-windows) there and also by
announcing details of a random subset of Z-windows,
they can judge the fraction of effective time windows
among all Z˜-windows thus they know the total number
of effective Z˜-windows among all effective Z-windows.
Then they can apply the tagged mode to calculate the
final key.
Virtual Protocol V2
V2-1 At any time window i, they send out to Char-
lie the real-photon state from pre-shared extended state
Ω, b = 0, 1,B,O. By measuring the local ancillary-
photon, they each know whether the time window is an
X-window or an Z-window. Explicitly, a local state |2〉〈2|
for an X+-window and a local state |3〉〈3| for an X−-
window. A local state |0〉〈0| or |1〉〈1| for a Z-window.
Though they know which time windows are Z-windows,
they don’t know the information on which kinds of Z-
windows, (Z0, Z1, ZB, ZO).
8V2-2 Charlie announces his measurement outcome of all
time windows.
V2-3 According to Charlie’s announcement, they are
aware of those effective Z-windows and X-windows. For
an Z-window, Alice (Bob) puts down a classical bit 0 (1)
if her (his) local ancillary state is vacuum and puts down
a classical bit 1 (0) if her (his) local ancillary state is one-
photon. They randomly take a subset v of Z-windows,
announcing local measurement outcome of each time win-
dows in set v so that they can judge the asymptotic value
of bit-flip error rate EZ by counting the number of effec-
tive Z˜-windows from all effective Z-windows of set v.
They estimate the phase-flip error rate eph effective bits
of Z˜-windows (time windows of Z0 and Z1) by Eq.(25)
through observing events of all X-windows.
V2-4 They regard the effective bits from Z˜-windows as
un-tagged bits and the effective bits from time windows
of ZB and ZO as tagged bits. Applying the tagged
model[19], they distill effective bits of Z-windows and
obtain the final key kf with the length given by Eq.(1).
Note 1 A bit-flip error is an effective Z-window when
Bob’s bit value is different from Alice’s. They can verify
it by testing a random subset of Z-windows.
Note 2 Estimating e¯ph the upper bound of phase flip error
rate by observing subset v of Z-windows only. Consider
Eq.(25). It is equivalent to
eph ≤ n
L
X−
+ nRX+
nX
≤ e¯ph = n¯
R
X+
− nLX+ + nLX
nX
(33)
here bar represent upper bound and underline represent
lower bound. nX : total effective X-windows, n
L
X : num-
ber of those effective X-windows heralded by detector L.
nda: number of effective a-windows heralded by detector
d, a = X+, X− and d = L,R.
Note 4 The X-windows are not really needed. Because
they can obtain the bound values n¯RX+ and n
L
X+
by ob-
serving a subset of Z-windows, instead of observing X-
windows. Therefore we can use fake X-windows to re-
place the original X-windows, provided that the real-
photon state of the fake X-windows is identical to that
of the original X-windows. Obviously, in the virtual pro-
tocol V2, a Z˜-window is a perfect fake X-window.
3. Virtual protocol V3
Preparation stage
They pre-share an extended mixed state of
Ω =
∑
y
pyΩy (34)
and p0 = p1.
Ω0 = |0, αB〉〈0, αB| ⊗ |01〉〈01|
Ω1 = |αA, 0〉〈αA, 0| ⊗ |10〉〈10|
ΩB = |αA, αB〉〈αA, αB| ⊗ |11〉〈11|
ΩO = |0, 0〉〈0, 0| ⊗ |00〉〈00|. (35)
In this virtual protocol, they don’t pre-share any clas-
sical information, but we can still define time windows
Z0, Z1, ZB, ZO by the four different ancillary states. Say,
if they each announce the local measurement outcome of
ancillary-photon state at a certain time window i, they
can know the specific kind of time window for i. In the
protocol they will take a random subset of time windows
v for error test. They each announce local measurement
outcome of the ancillary state of every time window in
set v.
Virtual Protocol V3
V3-1 At any time window i, they send out their real-
photon state.
V3-2 Charlie announces his measurement outcome of all
time windows.
V3-3 Alice (Bob) measures her (his) ancillary photon for
all effective time windows, outcome vacuum for a classi-
cal bit 0 (1) and outcome 1-photon for a bit value 1 (0).
Through classical communications, they take two random
subsets v, u for error test. They don’t announce infor-
mation of random subset u. Set u contains a subset of
Z˜-windows whose real-photon states sent out make a per-
fect fake state for the imaginary X-windows as defined
in the Virtual protocol V2. To every time window of set
v, they each announce the local measurement outcome of
ancillary-photon state. From this announced outcome,
they can know the bit-flip error rate EZ , and the fraction
of un-tagged bits, i.e., bits from time windows Z0 or Z1.
They also know the yield values of Sdy =
ndy
Ny
where ndy
is the number of effective windows heralded by event d
from all Zy-windows, y = B,O, i.e., the rate of effective
windows heralded by detector d for all time windows Zy,
where d = L,R and y = B,O. Using these values they
calculate the upper bound value of e¯ph of Eq.(25) for the
fake X-windows (Z˜-windows of set u).
V3-4 They distill effective bits of Z-windows and obtain
the final key kf . Applying the tagged model[19], they
have the length of final key by Eq.(1).
Note 1 They can produce the state of Eq.(34) locally. Set-
ting p0 = p1 = q(1− q), pO = (1− q)2 and pB = q2, they
can produce the state Ω of Eq.(34) locally in this way: At
every time i, Alice (Bob) randomly decides sending with
probability q or not-sending with probability (1− q). For
a decision sending, she (he) sends out a coherent state
|αA〉〈αA| (|αB〉〈αB |) to Charlie, puts down a bit value 1
(0), and produces a local state |1〉〈1|. For a not-sending
decision, she (he) sends out a vacuum to Charlie, puts
down a bit value 0 (1), and produces a local state |0〉〈0|.
If they produce the state Ω of Eq.(34) in this way, they
don’t need to pre-share anything. Also, without the local
ancillary-photon state they can still complete the final key
distillation therefore the local ancillary state is actually
not needed. This comes back to the real protocol.
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1. Input-Output model
Consider an input state to Charlie sent from Alice (and
Bob). Alice will observe Charlie’s instrument L for the
corresponding outcome (classical outcome). Charlie has
no access to Alice’s source.
Suppose in the beginning of a certain time window,
Charlie receives a state |ψ〉. We shall call this as input
state to Charlie. Consider the extended state made up
of the input and Charlie’s state |κ〉. Charlie’s instrument
state L is included in the ancillary state |κ〉. The initial
state is
|Ψini〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ |κ〉. (36)
At time t Charlie observes his instrument L to see the
result. His instrument L is observed by Alice and she can
find result from {li} accompanied with its eigenstate |li〉
then. Most generally, after state |ψ〉 is sent to Charlie,
Charlie’s initial state |Ψini〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ |κ〉 will evolve with
time under a quantum process. Here we assume a uni-
tary quantum process U . Even though Charlie presents
a non-unitary quantum process, it can be represented by
a unitary process through adding more ancillary states.
So, given the general ancillary state |κ〉, we can simply
assume a unitary quantum process for Charlie. At time
t, the state is now
|Ψ(t)〉 = U(t)|Ψini〉 = U(t)(|ψ〉 ⊗ |κ〉) (37)
In general, the state at time t can be written in a bipartite
form of another two subspaces, one is the instrument
space L and the other is the remaining part of the space,
subspace L¯. Given the initial input state |ψ〉 to Charlie,
the probability that he observes the result l1 at time t is
pl1 = 〈l1| trL¯ (|Ψ(t)〉〈Ψ(t)|) |l1〉 (38)
We will omit (t) in the following formulas. Suppose the
space L¯ is spanned by basis states {gk}, we can rewrite
Eq.(38) by
pl1 =
∑
k
|〈γ(l1)k |Ψ〉|2 (39)
where |γ(l1)k 〉 = |gk〉|l1〉.
Since in each time window i Charlie may use differ-
ent quantum process with different ancillary states and
different measurement, the quantum process should be
written as Ui and Eq.(39) should be written as:
nl1 =
K∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈γ(l1)i,k |Ψi〉|2 (40)
where nl1 is the number of time windows that Alice ob-
serves the outcome l1 from instrument L and K is the
total number of time windows.
Eqs. (39)(40) are our elementary formulas for the
input-output model.
2. Calculate the outcome of one input state by observing
the outcome for other states.
Imagine different sources, source 1 emits state |φ〉,
source 2 emits state state |φ0〉, and source 3 emits state
|φ1〉. State |φ〉 has the form of
|φ〉 = c0|φ0〉+ c1|φ1〉+ c2|φ2〉 (41)
At any time window i, Alice only uses one source. She
choose one source from 1, 2, 3 randomly with probabil-
ities d1, d2, d3, and, to distinguish states from different
sources, she produces a local ancillary state |1〉〈1|, |2〉〈2|,
and |3〉〈3| respectively when she uses sources 1,2,3. At
one time window, she will only use one source. A virtual
case that Alice and Bob prepare a state with density ma-
trix
ρ =d1|φ〉〈φ| ⊗ |1〉〈1|+ d2|φ0〉〈φ0| ⊗ |2〉〈2|
+ d3|φ1〉〈φ1| ⊗ |3〉〈3|, d1 + d2 + d3 = 1 (42)
where |k〉, k = 1, 2, 3 is the local auxiliary state. Then
they keep the auxiliary state and send out the real-
photon state to Charlie. (We name the state emitted
by source 1,2, or 3 as the real-photon state.) With the
elementary formula Eq.(40) in Sec.1 and Eq.(42), we have
the following extended state after Charlie completes op-
erations to the real-photon state from Alice and Charlie’s
ancillary state:
ρ˜ =d1|Φi〉〈Φi| ⊗ |1〉〈1|+ d2|Φ0i〉〈Φ0i| ⊗ |2〉〈2|
+ d3|Φ1i〉〈Φ1i| ⊗ |3〉〈3|, d1 + d2 + d3 = 1 (43)
where |Φi〉 = Ui(t)(|φ〉 ⊗ |κi〉), |Φki〉 = Ui(|φk〉 ⊗ |κi〉),
k = 0, 1. On the other hand, given Eq.(41), we have
|Φi〉 = c0|Φ0i〉+ c1|Φ1i〉+ c2|Φ2i〉. (44)
We can now write the formula for the number of the
l1-event of source k, n
l1
k , which is the number of time
windows heralded by joint events of outcome l1 for in-
strument L from source k, and k = 1, 2, 3. Since we have
already labeled each source by ancillary-photon states,
the number of the l1-event of source k is just the num-
ber of joint events of outcome of l1 from the instrument
and outcome |k〉〈k| from the measurement to the local
ancillary-photon state.
nl11 = d1
N∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈γ(l1)i,k |Φi〉|2 (45)
nl12 = d2
N∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈γ(l1)i,k |Φ0i〉|2 (46)
nl13 = d3
N∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈γ(l1)i,k |Φ1i〉|2 (47)
Therefore, we have the following formula for the num-
ber of l1-event from source 1:
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nl11 /d1 =
N∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈γ(l1)i,k |Φi〉|2 =|c0|2
N∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈γ(l1)i,k |Φ0i〉|2 + |c1|2
N∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈γ(l1)i,k |Φ1i〉|2 + |c2|2
N∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈γ(l1)i,k |Φ2i〉|2
+ 2
N∑
i=1
∑
k
Re(c0c1〈Φ0i|γ(l1)i,k 〉〈γ(l1)i,k |Φ1i〉) + 2
N∑
i=1
∑
k
Re(c0c2〈Φ0i|γ(l1)i,k 〉〈γ(l1)i,k |Φ2i〉)
+ 2
N∑
i=1
∑
k
Re(c1c2〈Φ1i|γ(l1)i,k 〉〈γ(l1)i,k |Φ2i〉)
(48)
For the term
∑N
i=1
∑
k Re(cc
′〈ψ|γ(l1)i,k 〉〈γ(l1)i,k |ψ′〉), with
any states |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉, we can use Cauchy inequality
(
m∑
k=1
akbk)
2 ≤
m∑
k=1
a2k
m∑
k=1
b2k, ak, bk ∈ R (49)
to obtain its bound:
|
N∑
i=1
∑
k
Re(cc′〈ψ|γ(l1)i,k 〉〈γ(l1)i,k |ψ′〉)|
≤|cc′|
N∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈ψ|γ(l1)i,k 〉||〈γ(l1)i,k |ψ′〉|
≤|cc′|
√√√√ N∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈ψ|γ(l1)i,k 〉|2
√√√√ N∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈γ(l1)i,k |ψ′〉|2
(50)
Recall Eq.(45,46,47) we have
nl11 /d1 =
N∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈γ(l1)i,k |Φi〉|2,
nl12 /d2 =
N∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈γ(l1)i,k |Φ0i〉|2,
nl13 /d3 =
N∑
i=1
∑
k
|〈γ(l1)i,k |Φ1i〉|2
(51)
Note that 0 ≤ ∑k〈Φ2i|γ(l1)i,k 〉〈γ(l1)i,k |Φ2i〉 ≤ 1. The upper
bound of nl11 /d1 can be obtained by
nl11 /d1 ≤ |c0|2nl12 /d2 + |c1|2nl13 /d3 + |c2|2 ·N
+ 2|c0c1|
√
nl12 n
l1
3
d2d3
+ 2|c0c2|
√
nl12 N
d2
+ 2|c1c2|
√
nl13 N
d3
(52)
and we also have the lower bound
nl11 /d1 ≥ |c0|2nl12 /d2 + |c1|2nl13 /d3
−

2|c0c1|
√
nl12 n
l1
3
d2d3
+ 2|c0c2|
√
nl12 N
d2
+ 2|c1c2|
√
nl13 N
d3


(53)
Then we define the yield of state |φ〉 for outcome l1 by
Sl1φ =
nl11
d1N
(54)
where d1N is the total number of time windows that use
source 1, which emits the real-photon state |φ〉. And
similarly
Sl1φ0 =
nl12
d2N
, Sl1φ1 =
nl13
d3N
(55)
Therefore, Eqs. (52)(53) can be written in the form of
yield:
Sl1φ ≤|c0|2Sl1φ0 + |c1|2Sl1φ1 + |c2|2
+ 2|c0c1|
√
Sl1φ0S
l1
φ1
+ 2|c0c2|
√
Sl1φ0 + 2|c1c2|
√
Sl1φ1
(56)
and
Sl1φ ≥|c0|2Sl1φ0 + |c1|2Sl1φ1
−
[
2|c0c1|
√
Sl1φ0S
l1
φ1
+ 2|c0c2|
√
Sl1φ0 + 2|c1c2|
√
Sl1φ1
]
(57)
With Eqs. (56)(57), they can estimate the bounds of yield
of state |φ〉 for l1-event even using the observed data of
other states.
3. Bound-value estimation in the protocol
In the protocol, we use real state |0, 0〉 in a time window
ZO and real state |αA, αB〉 in a time window ZB. The
yield for L-event or R-event of this two kinds of time win-
dows can be observed directly from the time windows of
random subset of v. We need to use these observed data
to calculate bound values for fraction of time windows
heralded by the outcome l1 among all X+-windows, say
Sl1X+ . In particular the lower bound for L-event S
L
X+ and
the upper bound for R-event S¯RX+ . We can directly apply
Eqs. (56)(57), with the real-photon states |φ〉, |φ0〉, and
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|φ1〉 being replaced by |χ+〉, |0, 0〉, and |αA, αB〉, respec-
tively. We can easily to obtain:
|χ+〉 = e
−µ|0, 0〉+ |αA, αB〉 − (1 − e−µ)|α˜A, α˜B〉
e−µ/2
√
2(1 + e−µ)
(58)
remind that
√
1− e−µ|α˜x〉 = |αx〉 − e−µ/2|0〉, x = A,B.
Therefore,
c0 =
e−µ/2√
2(1 + e−µ)
c1 =
1
e−µ/2
√
2(1 + e−µ)
c2 =
1− e−µ
e−µ/2
√
2(1 + e−µ)
(59)
We use notation Sl1y for the fraction of effective windows
heralded by outcome l1 among all y-windows of the test
set v and l1 = L,R, y = X+, ZB, ZO. Say, if there are
nl1y effective windows
Sl1X+ ≤ S
l1
X+ =
1
2(1 + e−µ)
{e−µSl1O + eµSl1B +
(1 − e−µ)2
e−µ
+ 2
√
Sl1OS
l1
B + 2(1− e−µ)
√
Sl1O +
2(1− e−µ)
e−µ
√
Sl1B }
(60)
Sl1X+ ≥ Sl1X+ =
1
2(1 + e−µ)
{e−µSl1O + eµSl1B
− 2[
√
Sl1OS
l1
B + (1− e−µ)
√
Sl1O +
1− e−µ
e−µ
(
√
Sl1B )]}
(61)
Replacing l1 in Eq.(60) above by R and l1 in Eq.(61) by
L, we obtain S¯RX+ and S
L
X+ .
4. Estimate the bound of the phase-flip error rate.
Suppose set u consists ofM X-windows, among which
there are (1 + e−µ)M/2 X+-windows and (1− e−µ)M/2
X−-windows. The phase-flip error rate is defined as
eph =
nRX+ + n
L
X−
nLX+ + n
R
X+
+ nLX− + n
R
X−
(62)
where nda represent the number of effective a-windows
heralded by detector d clicking. d = L,R and a =
X+, X−. Straightly, we have
eph =
nRX+ − nLX+ + nLX
nX
=
(1 + e−µ)
[
SRX+ − SLX+
]
+ 2SLX
2SX
(63)
where nX and SX are the number of effective events hap-
pened inX-windows and the fraction of effective windows
among all X-windows, respectively. We have the follow-
ing formula for the upper bound of phase-flip error rate
eph ≤ eph =
(1 + e−µ)
[
S
R
X+ − SLX+
]
+ 2SL
Z˜
2SZ˜
(64)
Here, SZ˜ is the fraction of effective windows among those
Z˜-windows in set u, which plays the role of fake X-
windows in the real protocol. SL
Z˜
is the fraction of ef-
fective windows heralded by the left detector among all
Z˜-windows in set u. Since a Z˜-window in set u is iden-
tical to a Z˜-window in set v, they can obtain the values
of SZ˜ , S
L
Z˜
by directly observing set v. The quantities of
S
R
X+ and S
L
X+ can be calculated by Eqs.(60,61).
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